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Many countries assess the effects of legislation by way of evaluation or regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA). The following article will discuss the functions of these 
methods and refer to the competent bodies’ responsibility for legislative evaluation 
from a Swiss legal perspective. It will be argued that a mechanical or 
"one-size-fits-all" approach does not best serve the goals behind these practices but 
that a tailored and proportional application is warranted. Hence, it will also 
tentatively outline best practices for evaluation.
1. Legal Sources
1.1. National Law
1.1.1. Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution
Switzerland is one of the few countries that introduce legislative evaluation on 
the constitutional level. It does so in Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution, which 
reads: "The Federal Assembly shall ensure that federal measures are evaluated with 
regard to their effectiveness."1)
The constitution does not offer any legal definition for evaluation. Ideally, the 
legislator specifies the term. Thus, definitions and specifications of the term are 
embedded in the respective laws that include evaluation clauses.
The term "evaluation", the responsibility of Parliament to evaluate, and the legal 
consequences of a constitutional provision will be discussed in detail. It can already 
be pointed out that the term evaluation is rather broadly understood,2) that it is 
not only the Swiss Parliament that evaluates legislation and that the anchorage of 
evaluations in the Constitution is not to be overestimated.3) 
1) Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV] [Swiss Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 
101 (Switz.).
2) See infra section 2.
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1.1.2. Federal Act on the Federal Assembly
An important concretization of article 170 of the Swiss Constitution constitutes 
Art. 141 of the Federal Act on the Federal Assembly of December 13, 2002.4) It 
obliges government to document its bills to Parliament with a report containing 
information on "the planned implementation of the enactment, the planned 
evaluation of its implementation and the assessment of the planned implementation 
that took place in the preliminary stages of the legislative process" (lit. d). 
Government must also provide information on "the consequences for the economy, 
society, the environment and future generations" (lit. g). It is understood that these 
requirements leave substantial discretion to government with respect to how much 
detail the Parliament is provided with.5) Still, there is no doubt that important 
questions must be sufficiently analyzed and documented. 
Furthermore, on the basis of article 170 of the Swiss Constitution, the Federal 
Assembly has a mandate to take further action.6) Article 27 of the Federal Act on 
the Federal Assembly entitles the organs of the Federal Assembly designated by law 
to "ensure that measures taken by the Confederation are evaluated as to their 
effectiveness." The law stipulates three ways to attain this aim. Firstly, the appointed 
bodies may "request the Federal Council to have impact assessments carried out" 
(lit. a), secondly "examine the impact assessments carried out on the instructions 
of the Federal Council" (lit. b) or lastly "instruct impact assessments to be carried 
3) See infra section 4.
4) Bundesgesetz über die Bundesversammlung [Parlamentsgesetz, ParlG] [Federal Act on the Federal 
Assembly] Dec. 13, 2002, SR 171.10 (Switz.).
5) Although, there are principles and requirements concerning documentation, see Leitfaden für Botschaften 
des Bundesrates [Guideline for Documentation of the Federal Council], 
pp. 20 et seq., https://www.bk.admin.ch/dokumentation/sprachen/04915/06864/, see also Richtlinien des 
Bundes für die Darstellung der volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Vorlagen des Bundes [Directives 
of the Federal Council for the Presentation of The Economic Impact of Federal Laws], 
https://www.seco.admin.ch/dam/seco/de/dokumente/Wirtschaft/Wirtschaftspolitik/RFA/Hilfsmittel/Richtli
nien%20des%20Bundesrates.pdf.download.pdf/directives_d.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
6) Giovanni Biaggini, BV Kommentar [Commentary on the Swiss Constitution], Art. 170 para. 3 (2007).
ﬁﬂﬃ!"#$%&'()     
"
out themselves" (lit. c). These tasks are mainly carried out by Committees7) whose 
duties are, inter alia, set out in Art. 44 para. 1 of the Federal Act on the Federal 
Assembly. Committees are "responsible for impact assessments in their areas of 
responsibility (lit. e) and they also "take account of the result of impact assessment" 
carrid out by the government (lit. f).
1.1.3. Evaluation Clauses in Federal Acts
So far, Parliament has quite often provided for specific clauses (about 112 clauses 
in total) requiring evaluation in roughly 90 federal acts.8) The respective clauses 
differ in terms of the questions to be evaluated, the responsible authority for the 
evaluation, the time frame (one-off or recurrent process), the addressees of the 
evaluation results and the consequences attached to a certain outcome. These clauses 
are important triggers for evaluation.9) 
Still, Parliament and government are free to conduct evaluations also in the 
absence of such clauses. In-depth evaluations may be part of Parliamentary oversight, 
preparatory work for draft laws or effective implementation and review thereof.10)
1.2 OECD
The OECD is an important proponent of evaluations. In its 2012 
 7) See Art. 42 et seq. ParlG; see also https://www.parlament.ch/en/organe/committees (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). 
 8) See Übersicht über die Evaluationsklauseln des Bundes [List of Evaluation Clauses of the 
Swiss Federation], https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/staat/evaluation/materialien/uebersicht.html 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
 9) See Thomas Widmer, Der Beitrag der Evaluation zu einer guten Gesetzgebung, vol. 1, LeGes  Gesetzgebung 
& Evaluation, 15, para. 2.4 at pp. 17-18 (2015), see also Thomas Widmer, Evaluation: Woher, Wohin 
und Wozu? vol.1, SZK  Zeitschrift für Kriminologie, 8, at p. 10 (2016), the increase of evaluation 
clauses also caused an increase of specialized units (mainly within the administration, see also infra section 
4), which are responsible for implementation of evaluation obligations.
10) Georg Müller & Felix Uhlmann, Elemente einer Rechtssetzungslehre, para. 79 (3rd ed. 2013).
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Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance,11) the organization urges 
its members to "integrate Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA)12) into the early 
stages of the policy process for the formulation of new regulatory proposals."13) 
Members should also "conduct systematic programme reviews of the stock of 
significant regulation against clearly defined policy goals, including consideration of 
costs and benefits, to ensure that regulations remain up to date, are cost justified, 
cost effective and consistent, and deliver the intended policy objectives."14) 
The OECD advises its member states and reviews their policies.15) Switzerland 
adheres to these principles.16)
11) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council on 
Regulatory Policy and Governance, (Mar. 22, 2012) [hereinafter OECD 2012 Recommendation].
12) See infra section 2b).
13) OECD 2012 Recommendation, supra note 11, para. 4 at p. 4.
14) Id. para. 5 at p. 4. See also Stephan Naundorf & Claudio M. Radaelli, Chapter 11: Regulatory 
Evaluation Ex ante and Ex Post: Best Practice, Guidance and Methods, in Legislation and Legisprudence 
in Europe, a Comprehensive Guide for Scholars and Practitioners (Ulrich Karpen & Helen Xanthaki 
:;<=> ?@ABCD@EFGH IJKLM> NC:A: BC:O A:?:A B@ PQRS 2015 Regulatory Policy Outlook 
TUVVWXYYZZZ[\]]W]]\[^_`/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/oecd-regulatory-policy-outlook-2015_9
abcdefdgbaahi
]
jk
W
lm
]
n [last visited Sept. 12, 2016]) and outline that "the implementation 
of regulatory policies should build on a clear methodology, on instruments for oversight and 
quality control, on stakeholder engagement and transparency, and finally on the systematic 
adoption of the respective practices".
15) See also OECD 2012 Recommendation, supra note 11, pp. 20–21, the term "regulation" refers to "the 
diverse set of instruments by which governments set requirements on enterprises and citizens". Thus, 
recommendations and reviews include a broad spectrum of state activity. See 
thereto OECD Recommendations and Guidelines on Regulatory Policy, 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatory-policy/recommendations-guidelines.htm see also 
Regulatory reform in OECD Countries: Reports by Subject, 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/regulatoryreforminoecdcountriesreportsbysubject.htm, (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016).
16) Switzerland is a founding member of the OECD (founded in 1961) and has a permanent delegation 
to the organization, see The Federal Department for Foreign Affairs’ Thematic Domains 
with the OECD, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-organizations/oecd
/thematic-domains.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
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2. Terminology and Methods
2.1. Evaluation
Evaluation is the term commonly used in Switzerland. It denominates a systematic 
and scientifically sound analysis of the effects of regulation.17) The Swiss Society 
for Evaluation (SEVAL)18) has published standards for its members,19) drawing upon 
the "Program Evaluation Standards" of the "Joint Committee on Standards for 
Educational Evaluation".20)
It should be noted that while the effectiveness of a regulation is articulated in 
article 170 of the Swiss Constitution as the most important object of evaluation, 
it is not the only one. Evaluation is understood in a broader sense21), encompassing 
also the possible negative consequences of the law.22)
17) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 77 et seq; see also Thomas Widmer et al., Evaluations-Standards 
der Schweizerischen Evaluationsgesellschaft, Seval, pp. 1 et seq. (Dec. 5, 2000), 
www.seval.ch/de/documents/seval_Standards_2001_dt.pdf; see e.g. State Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs [SECO], Evaluation Programme, http://www.seco-cooperation.admin.ch/theme
n/01033/01037/index.html?lang=en (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
18) See SEVAL, http://www.seval.ch (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
19) Widmer et al., supra note 17; see also Thomas Widmer, Zehn Jahre Evaluationsstandards der Schweizerischen 
Evaluationsgesellschaft (SEVAL-Standards), vol. 2, SZK  Zeitschrift für Kriminologie, 23, at pp. 25 et 
seq. (2011). SEVAL-Standards address evaluators, contracting authorities for evaluation, and other 
authorities, which may influence the process and therefore the outcome of evaluations. The standards 
are not considered to serve the purpose of a "Code of Conduct". They are rather a benchmark for 
quality regarding the evaluation process and evaluation results. See also extensively, Mauro Zamboni, 
Chapter 6: Goals and Measures of Legislation: Evaluation, in Legislation and Legisprudence in Europe, a 
Comprehensive Guide for Scholars and Practitioners (Ulrich Karpen & Helen Xanthaki eds., forthcoming 
2017), pp. 1 et seq. of the chapter, where he brings up a new point highlighting the importance of 
addressing three preliminary aspects before planning an evaluation inquiry about a piece of legislation. 
In particular, the author draws the evaluators’ attention to a) the structure of the legislative goals, 
namely where and when the legislative goals are intended to be realised and how the legislative goals 
can be traced, b) the functions of the legislative measures and how they relate to the relvant goals 
and c) the location of the legislative goals, i.e which are the sources evaluators should resort to in 
order to discover them and how to examine this material using traditional or non-traditional instruments.
20) See Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, http://www.jcsee.org (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). 
21) See Biaggini, supra note 6, Art. 170 para. 2.
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2.2. Regulatory Impact Analysis
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is the term used by the OECD and in many 
countries.23) In my view, it is difficult to draw a clear boundary between the two 
terms, "evaluation" and "RIA",24) and in this paper they are used interchangeably. 
2.3. Standard Cost Model
The Standard Cost Model (SCM) is designed to measure administrative 
consequences for private enterprises.25) As it focuses on administrative costs only, 
22) See e.g. Bundesgesetz über das Öffentlichkeitsprinzip der Verwaltung [Öffentlichkeitsgesetz BGÖ] [Federal 
Act on Freedom of Information in the Administration] Dec. 17, 2004, SR 152.3, Art. 19 (Switz.), 
the provision states that evaluation must include the costs incurred in the law’s implementation and 
be reported to the Federal Council regularly. 
23) See OECD 2012 Recommendation, supra note 11, para. 46 at pp. 4; 25 et seq. The OECD defines RAI 
as "a systemic approach to critically assessing the positive and negative effects of proposed and existing 
regulations and non-regulatory alternatives. As employed in OECD countries it encompasses a range 
of methods. It is an important element of an evidence-based approach to policy making", see 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/ria.htm. See Jonathan Verschuuren & Rob van Gestel, Ex Ante 
Evaluation of Legislation: An Introduction, in The Impact of Legislation, A Critical Analysis of Ex 
Ante Evaluation (Jonathan Verschuuren ed., 2009) p. 6, where RAI is defined as a method of ex-ante 
evaluation. That is to say, ex-ante evaluation is seen as "a broader concept than RIA". See also Naundorf 
& Radaelli, supra note 14, pp. 2 et seq. of the chapter, for an analytical reference to RIA, where they 
mention that RIA should be primarily understood as "a process, fostering evidence-based learning and 
decision-making, that can be used for different aims and its principles and methods are easily transferrable 
to ex post evaluations too". See also, Andrea Renda, The Development of RIA in the European Union: An 
Overview, pp. 18 et seq. (Sept. 20, 2010), where RAI in the EU and in individual European Countries 
is analysed, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679764 (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
24) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 82; see also Carl Boehret & Goetz Konzendorf, Guidelines 
on Regulatory Impact Assessment (RAI), prepared for the Federal Ministry of the Interior and for the Ministry 
of the Interior of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Speyerer Forschungsberichte 234, pp. 5 et seq. (Nov. 2004), 
in this study the term "RAI" comprises prospective, concurrent and retrospective RAIs. Therefore, a 
clear differentiation from evaluation may be difficult due to the different usage of the respective terms. 
25) See Frank A.G. den Butter, Marc de Graaf & André Nijsen, The Transaction Costs Perspective on Costs 
And Benefits of Government Regulation: Extending The Standard Cost Model, 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 09-013/3, pp. 4 et seq. (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345789; see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], International Standard Cost Manual, pp. 6 et seq. 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/34227698.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
ﬁﬂﬃ!"#$%&'()     

it provides for reliable and comparable data. It does not assess possible benefits or 
negative effects of regulation other than costs.26) 
The SCM was first developed in the Netherlands but it is now widely used by 
various countries, e.g. by Germany.27) The SCM is not applied in Switzerland, yet, 
recent proposals all the more look closely at the effects of regulation on small and 
medium sized enterprises.28)
3. Functions
3.1. Information and Transparency
The first function of evaluation constitutes information and transparency. 
Evaluation forces the legislator to present the goals of a law.29) This alone is valuable 
as complex legislation may often pursue conflicting goals and the evaluation may 
help to set priorities.30)
26) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 68.
27) See den Butter, de Graaf & Nijsen, supra note 25, pp. 5 et seq.; see also German Federal Statistcal 
Office, Programme for Bureaucracy Reduction and Better Legislation, Introduction of the Standard Cost Model, 
Methodology Manual of the Federal Government, pp. 5 et seq. (Nov. 22, 2006) 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Indicators/BureaucracyCosts/Download/SCMManual.pdf?__blo
b=publicationFile (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). See also German Federal Government: Nationaler 
Normenkontrollrat (NKR), Overview of NKR Tasks, Methodology: 
https://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/EN/Overview_of_Tasks/Methodology/_nodn.html;
jsessionid=E87021525AE81BE45871CEB672A100D5.s2t2 (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).Furthermore, 
SCM is used among other countries e.g. by Scotland, Slovienia, Ireland, Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark 
and the UK.
28) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 69; see also Werner Bussmann, Die prospektive Evaluation 
und ihre Verfahren zur Prüfung von Erlassen, vol. 2, LeGes  Gesetzgebung & Evaluation, 175, at p. 181 
(2009).
29) Widmer, supra note 9, para. 2.4 at p. 18; see also OECD 2012 Recommendation, supra note 11, para. 
6 at pp. 4, 13. See also Werner Schroeder, Bessere Ergebnisse durch bessere Rechtsetzung, vol. 3, Zeitschrift 
für Gesetzgebung, 193, at p. 200 (2016), evaluation provides furthermore an information basis to 
the legislator. Based on the findings the Commission of the European Union for example identifies 
"necessity and effectiveness" (Notwendigkeit und Wirksamkeit) of a legislative proposal at an early 
stage of the legislative process.
30) On a similar note about the function of evaluation, see Zamboni supra note 19, p. 1 of the chapter, 
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The legislator must not only present the goals of the law but should also take 
into account its possible side-effects i.e. the legislator may not think only of the 
benefits of the law but should also consider its disadvantages. By way of example, 
disadvantages may comprise costs for bothprivate parties and the government, let 
alone restrictions to individuals’ fundamental rights and to economic freedoms.31) 
Finally, new regulation may as well create legal uncertainty and there are also cases 
in which the lawmaker should try to anticipate avoidance strategies of private parties. 
Private parties may circumvent new rules by stockpiling less ecological goods (e.g. 
light bulbs) or turning to foreign countries.
When the positive and negative effects of the law are properly analyzed, 
evaluation reveals the choices of the legislator. The intentions of the legislator 
become transparent. 
3.2. Accountability
Related to the aforementioned aspect of transparency, evaluations may also 
enhance political accountability. If the effects of a law are known, the legislator must 
react accordingly, and if not, at least the legislator may not contend later that the 
effects of the law were unexpected or unknown. The knowledge that results from 
evaluations makes the legislator accountable for the laws passed, at least in a political 
sense.32)
who argues that legislation is a tool whereby different actors implement certain ideas and visions within 
a community of people. Thus, it is important that it is evaluated in respect of the results the legislative 
process aspires to achieve and those that are actually achieved. That said, the essential component 
of evaluating the quality of legislation is its relational nature. 
31) The Commission of the European Union has a "Better Regulation Agenda", in which the Commission 
defines its strategy towards better regulation. The Agenda sets new standards on transparency. One 
of the main objectives is to ensure that decision-making is open and transparent and that regulatory 
burdens on business, citizens or public administrations are kept to a minimum, see Better Regulation: 
Why and How, http://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/better-regulation-why-and-how_en (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016). See also European Commission, Better Regulation for Better Results – an EU agenda, pp. 
5-6 (May 15, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-regulation-better-results-eu-agenda-0_en (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
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However, I would like to point out also a possible risk that evaluations carry 
since one may argue that they may decrease accountability instead. Indeed, the 
legislator may be tempted to follow expert's advice blindly, and in case of unexpected 
negative effects, choose to "hide" behind scientific advice.33) In my view, it is always 
the legislator that is ultimately responsible for legislation, and critical analysis of 
the scientific findings is certainly warranted. An evaluation should not lead to a 
form of "expertocracy" but rather help the legislator to make sensible choices.34)
3.3. Rationality
It is often said that evaluations enhance rationality. This is certainly true as long 
as evaluations help to make legislative choices transparent as discussed before. It 
is also true that knowledge supports rational decisions. That said, evaluations 
32) The Commission of the European Union stated that the European elections in 2014 showed citizens’ 
concern “with what they perceive as an undesirable level of EU involvement in their daily lives”. 
Thereupon, the Commission pursues now various objectives set out in the “Better Regulation Agenda” 
(see supra note 31). The Commission recognizes its duty to ensure more efficient laws and respond 
to citizens’ expectations by better regulation. Evaluation is a substantial part of this agenda and is 
seen as an instrument to achieve the agenda's objectives. See also European Commission, Fact Sheet, 
Better Regulation Agenda: Questions & Answers, p. 1 (May 19, 2015) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4989_en.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
33) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 70. See also Naundorf & Radaelli, supra note 14, p. 22 
of the chapter, who mention that consultation of experts in the framework of RIA should adhere to 
the principles of pluralism, discursive representation and transparency.
34) See Patricia Popelier & Victoria Verlinden, The Context of the Rise of Ex Ante Evaluation, in The Impact 
of Legislation, A Critical Analysis of Ex Ante Evaluation (Jonathan Verschuuren ed., 2009) pp. 19-20, 
the legislator "must always be open to corrections"; specialists cannot be held responsible for decisions. 
They "do not account for absolute truth or executable decisions". See also Christof Rissi & Fritz Sager, 
Types of Knowledge Utilization of Regulatory Impact Assessments: Evidence from Swiss Policymaking, vol. 7, 
Regulation & Governance, 348, at pp. 348-349 (2013), the OECD "expects RAIs to strengthen the 
position of factual arguments by experts over ideological arguments advanced by politicians". Experts 
may have an influence on the policymaking process as "political agents who try to enforce their discursive 
version of the truth upon the public sphere". Nevertheless, they cannot be "guardians of the truth" 
or sole decision makers. On the latter point see also Schroeder, supra note 29, p. 201, who argues 
that evaluation informs the legislator about possible consequences of their actions or laws. Evaluation 
constitutes an empirical element in the legislative process and improves the rational information finding 
and decision making but does not substitute political decision making.
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sensitize Parliament and government to a diligent determination of goals and 
measures.35)
However, in my view, it would be mistaken to overemphasize the contrast 
between "rational" choices based on evaluations on the one hand and "political" 
choices based on mere sentiment on the other. Evaluations do not absolve the 
legislator from hard choices. This is especially true when the legislator faces 
advantages and disadvantages that cannot be easily weighted against each other, 
such as costs against intangible benefits. Some countries try to monetarize all effects 
of the law to solve this problem.36) However, in my view, it is preferable that the 
legislator attaches values to certain benefits since absolute monetarization pretends 
a precision that does not exist.
It should also be noted that evaluation is not an exact science. Different 
methodological approaches may be all sound but do not necessarily produce the same 
results.37) This is especially true if future effects of the law are to be predicted. 
In this respect, it seems important that the legislator stays alert and poses critical 
questions when confronted with the results of an evaluation.
4. Responsibility
4.1. Parliament
In Switzerland, the evaluation clause in the Constitution attributes the 
35) See Popelier & Verlinden, supra note 34, p. 18, a "rational decision making process" ideally "produces 
laws which endeavour to reach specifically defined aims in the most efficient way". It uses a system 
of information gathering and evaluation”. Evaluation is therefore seen as a crucial instrument for rational 
and efficient legislative action.
36) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 70; see extensively Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Teltock, 
Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?, vol. 22, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 67, at 
pp. 3 et seq. (2008). 
37) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 84 et seq; see also e.g. Boehret & Konzendorf, supra note 
24, pp. 7 et seq.
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responsibility to initiate legislative evaluations to the Parliament. This seems sensible 
given that the Parliament is ultimately responsible for passing new legislation and 
assessing existing legislation. It is also the Parliament that may transpose the 
constitutional provision into specific laws. It has done so through the evaluation 
clauses discussed earlier.38) The Parliament may also evaluate a specific law or 
provision.39)
In Switzerland, the Parliament is comparably poorly staffed.40) It will often 
mandate government or private experts to evaluate a specific law or provision. This 
is generally accepted but it may be considered less than ideal as government and 
private actors influence the design and possibly also the outcome of the evaluation. 
The Parliament has recently extended its evaluation services, which form part of 
the Parliamentary oversight.41)
4.2. Government
Irrespective of the Parliament’s duty to evaluate legislation (according to the Swiss 
38) See supra section 1a)iii. 
39) Cf. Werner Bussmann, The Emergence of Evaluation in Switzerland, vol. 14, Evaluation, 499, at pp. 499 
et seq. (Oct. 2008). 
40) See Heidi Z’Graggen & Wolf Linder, Professionalisierung der Parlamente im internationalen Vergleich, Studie 
im Auftrag der Parlamentsdienste der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung pp. 34, 48 et seq. (Aug. 2004), 
Switzerland’s Parliament has limited resources compared to other OECD member countries. A study 
has shown that the Swiss Parliament is one of the 
least "professionalised" but one of the most cost-efficient Parliaments, 
https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/_layouts/15/DocIdRedir.aspx?ID=DOCID-1
-8024 (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
41) See Verordnung der Bundesversammlung zum Parlamentsgesetz und über die Parlamentsverwaltung 
[Parlamentsverwatlungsverordnung, ParlVV] [Parliamentary Administration Ordinace] Oct. 3, 2003, 
SR 171.115 Art. 10 (Switz.); the Parliamentary Control of the Administration (PCA) conducts evaluaitons 
– it is "the evaluation service of the Federal Assembly", see 
https://www.parlament.ch/en/organe/committees/parliamentary-control-administration-pca (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2016); see extensively Simone Ledermann, Die Ausgestalung der Unabhängigkeit von 
Evaluationsdiensten: Die Parlamentarische Verwaltungskontrolle im Kontext der Aufsichtsorgane des Bundes, vol. 
1, LeGes  Gesetzgebung & Evaluation, 63, at pp. 69 et seq. (2016); see also Jahresbericht 2015 der 
Parlamentarischen Verwaltungskontrolle, BBl 6329, at p. 6336 (2016). 
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Constitution), the government can and should evaluate laws too. The government 
typically has the duty to execute laws, including the right to enact secondary 
legislation and the right to propose new laws.42) Proper execution of existing laws 
and sound proposals for new laws necessarily include a certain amount of evaluation. 
Indeed, the most common implementation of article 170 of the Swiss Constitution 
does not concern evaluation through Parliament but through government when 
proposing a new law.43)
4.3. Administration
It may also be that an administrative agency conducts an evaluation. It may do 
so mandated by the government but also on its own initiative. This is often the 
case if the agency is tasked with the implementation of existing laws or with 
proposing new laws44). If an agency only occasionally conducts evaluations, it is 
certainly important that sufficient expertise is applied. This holds also true if a private 
expert is mandated. As there are often several ways to approach an evaluation, it 
is essential that the agency instructs properly the private expert. 
4.4. Independent Agency
There is no doubt that the results of an evaluation may bring to the forefront 
critical political implications. Hence, it seems sensible that the bearer of possible 
bad news is somehow shielded from political retaliation. In my view, it is advisable 
that evaluations are conducted by an agency or a body that enjoys certain 
independence.45) This means that the agency should be independent not only from 
42) Art. 182 BV.
43) See supra section 1a)ii.
44) See Müller & Uhlmann, supra note 10, para. 74-76; see also Prognos, Expert Report on the Implementation 
of Ex-Post Evaluations, Good Practice and Experience in other Countries, p. 32 (Dec. 6, 2013).
45) See e.g. The UK Regulatory Policy Committee [RPC] operates as an advisory non-departmental public 
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political parties but also from state organs, i.e. neither directly accountable to the 
government nor to the Parliament but serves both organs.46)
Evaluations also require expertise and experience that can best be provided by 
a specialized unit.47) Evaluations also require a certain level of expertise and 
experience by the competent bodies. That said, the establishment of specialised units 
that will be entrusted with the examination of specific subject matters may ensure 
the efficacy of the evaluation process. Unfortunately, Switzerland has not put 
something like this in effect yet.48)
5. Timing (ex ante-evaluation, ex post-evaluation, 
accompanying evaluation)
Evaluations may be conducted ex ante, ex post or accompanying a project.49) 
body, sponsored by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The RPC provides 
the government with external, independent scrutiny of new regulatory and deregulatory proposals, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/regulatory-policy-committee/about (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). 
46) See extensively Ledermann, supra note 41, pp. 64-67.
47) The Commission of the European Union has a highly specialized and independent Regulatory Scrutiny 
Board, which reviews the quality of impact assessments and major evaluations of EU policies and laws, 
see http://ec.europa.eu/info/law-making-process/regulatory-scrutiny-board_en (last visited Sept. 12, 
2016). 
48) See Bussmann, supra note 39, p. 504, points out that so far evaluation development in Switzerland 
has involved various actors and therefore has been an interactive process between Parliament, public 
administration, the academic community and private associations as well as other federal offices. 
49) See Bussmann, supra note 39, offers "seven points of entry" for evaluation in the "policy-formulation 
and policy-implementation process" in Switzerland. See also Schroeder, supra note 29, pp. 202-203, in 
the European Union the evaluation process ("Folgenabschätzungs-prozess") is initiated with an "Inception 
Impact Assessment". This tool allows the Commission of the European Union to set out a comprehensive 
specification of the proposed law and its possible effects at an early stage of the evaluation process. 
The Inception Impact Assessment includes a problem definition, regulatory objectives and possible 
political options and describes their potential effects. The main results of the Inecption Impact Assessment 
are summarized in a report. The "Regulatory Scrunity Board” reviews this report and forwards it to 
the competent department of the Commission. The Inception Impact Assessment and the Board’s review 
results constitute an outline that is used for a legislative proposal and a final report on the Inception 
Impact Assessment. Therefore, this method of early detection of possible consequences of a law is an 
important information basis for the legislative proposal and the following political discourse on legislation. 
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The timing for the most beneficial evaluation of a legislative project may be debated, 
but I believe such an abstract discussion is to little avail. An ex ante-evaluation 
is helpful to avoid possible mistakes but often lacks relevant data.50) Ex 
post-evaluations may lead to more pertinent conclusions due to sufficient practical 
experience from the implementation of the new law but as it is applied 
retrospectively, the negative effects of the new legislation are unlikely to be 
prevented.51) Hence, it hugely depends on the context whether ex ante, ex post, 
accompanying evaluation or all three are required.
One may certainly contend that the Parliament should not "forget" its laws. Ex 
ante-evaluation does not exempt either the Parliament or the government from 
monitoring the consequences of a law. Good legislation, including proper evaluation, 
is not a one-off task but a permanent duty. Hence, ex ante and ex-post evaluation 
should be understood rather complementary than mutually exclusive.
6. Practical Use  The-More-The-Better?
There is no doubt that evaluations may bring important insights into the process 
of lawmaking. Hence, it is understandable that many legal systems make evaluations 
mandatory either before or after enacting a new law. The OECD recommendations 
clearly require extensive regulatory impact analysis.52)
50) See Verschuuren & van Gestel, supra note 23, p. 4, they define ex-ante evaluation as a "future oriented 
research into the expected effects and side-effects of potential new legislation, following a structured 
and formalized procedure and leading to a written report. Such research includes a study of the possible 
effects and side-effects of alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating at all." This definition 
underlines the problem of the abstract character of ex-ante evaluation but also highlights the importance 
of the method with regards to structured research as an approach that can form the basis for making 
legislative decisions.
51) Cf. id, p. 4, it is argued that ex post evaluation is also "demand-driven, with few opportunities of 
cross-fertilization of evaluation results". That being said, ex post evaluation may in some cases not 
only be belated but finally not useful for further discussion on the respective legislation process. However, 
ex-post evaluation is an important tool to analyse the law’s concrete effects; see also OECD 2012 
Recommendation, supra note 11, pp. 26-27.
52) See OECD 2012 Recommendation, supra note 11, pp. 4-5.
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In my view, there is one important caveat to be observed. Proper evaluation needs 
resources even more critical in the legislative process is time.53) It seems unrealistic 
to assess every possible consequence of every provision of every law. The real 
challenge of evaluations is to properly choose the subjects for in-depth evaluation. 
I would contend that the legislator is much better served with a good selection of 
important issues rather than with superficial evaluations on every possible subject. 
It seems of high importance to prioritize.54) This requires proper planning of the 
legislative process and necessary observation of the laws passed by the Parliament.
7. Legal and Political Consequences
7.1. Legal Consequences
It is generally accepted that article 170 of the Swiss Constitution does not entail 
direct legal consequences that may stem from a legislative evaluation. In particular, 
a legal provision may not be challenged before the courts on the grounds that 
article 170 of the Swiss Constitution has been violated.55) In fact, the Swiss Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to invalidate state (cantonal) laws that are methodically 
flawed and has required little factual proof from legislator that a certain state 
measure is indeed effective. In practice, a measure "worth trying" with presumably 
little effect will typically survive judicial scrutiny.56) 
53) See Bussmann, supra note 28, p. 176.
54) Cf. Widmer, Evaluation: Woher, Wohin und Wozu?, supra note 9, p.11; see also Werner Bussmann, Art. 
170, in Die Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, St. Galler Kommentar, para. 8 (Bernhard Ehrenzeller 
et. al. eds., 2014). See also Schroeder, supra note 29, p. 201, the number of evaluations conducted 
by the Comission of the European Union has increased and will continuously rise since the Commission 
strives for comprehensive evaluation of legislation.
55) See Bussmann, supra note 54, para. 10, 25. 
56) Bundesgerichtsentscheid [BGE] [Federal Supreme Court Decision] 109 Ia 33, 39 (Switz.), "Die von 
der angefochtenen Norm erstrebte Preisparität mag möglicherweise keine starke Wirkung gegen den 
Alkoholismus entfalten, sie braucht aber nicht völlig wirkungslos zu sein" ("The price parity sought 
by the contested provision may not have a strong effect on alcoholism, but it doesn’t need to be 
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Other courts are more demanding. The US Supreme Court has, in other areas, 
developed requirements that resemble a "due process of lawmaking".57) The German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht regularly requires legislator to present the Court with a 
factual substantiation of its assumptions. Such evidence can be delivered by 
evaluations. The Bundesverfassungsgericht strikes down laws that lack sufficient 
factual analysis.58)
Technically, it is conceivable that a law attaches direct consequences to the fact 
that a certain measurable goal is not attained. Such provisions might be found in 
environmental protection laws.59) Still, in most instances, negative results require 
a revised decision from the legislator.
7.2. Political Consequences
Evaluations typically have political consequences. They help the legislator to make 
the best choices available. They also serve as a benchmark for determining whether 
the government has reached the goals stipulated in legislation. It is for this reason 
that evaluations may (and should) become highly political but shouldn't be 
politicized.60) It has been pointed out before that a preferable option would be to 
shield the evauation body from political pressure.61)
wholly ineffective" [translated by the author]).
57) See extensively Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, pp. 199 et seq. (1976); 
see also e.g. United States v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
58) See e.g Entscheid des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court Decision] 50, 
290, at pp. 333 et seq. (Germany); see also BVerfGE 57, 139, at pp. 159 et seq. (Germany) with further 
references.
59) See e.g. Bundesgesetz über die Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen [CO2-Gesetz] [Federal Act on the Reduction 
of CO2-Emissions] Dec. 23, 2011, SR 641.71, Art. 29 (Switz.).
60) Cf. Bussmann, supra note 39, p. 501, in a political system, which is shaped by various political actors, 
evaluation should ideally "serve as a resource for all partners" at all political levels. Evaluation may 
bring out the main points of a law and serve as a basis for discussion, where different interests are 
involved. Therefore, evaluation may also "improve the quality of argumentation within the legislative 
process".
61) See supra section 4d).
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In order to play a proper role in politics, it seems essential that the results of 
evaluations are published. It is an imperative of transparency that results are made 
available by the government, ideally on its website.62) The results should also be 
included in the accompanying documents, if draft legislation undergoes a 
consultation process.63) In this respect, evaluations serve the goals of government 
oversight through the public and of a meaningful dialogue with the public.64)
Switzerland has a tradition of publishing the results of evaluations,65) and a recent 
comparative study has indeed recommended this practice.66) I concur with the 
study’s findings. There are only limited situations in which one might think of a 
sufficient interest of government not to publish the results of an evaluation. This 
might be the case of an ex ante-evaluation being conducted very early in the process 
and the publication may trigger a debate that is unwarranted at this stage. In such 
cases, governmental discretion might outweigh the public interest to access the 
results.
The duty to publish the results should not lead to a decrease of evaluations in 
62) See e.g. UK Impact Assessment, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia (last visited Sept. 12, 2016), where 
the UK government provides all relevant data on RAI online; see also List of 
Impact Assessment of the EU, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_out/cia_2016_
en.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2016), where the reports of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (see supra 
note 47) are published after the EU Commission has adopted corresponding proposals.
63) See Bussmann, supra note 39, p. 500, within this context one should consider the specific characteristics 
of the Swiss political system and its participants. Extensive political rights and multiple levels of 
government allow broad political participation of different institutions and the public on legislation. 
Therefore, in Switzerland "public policies are more widely debated by the public than in most other 
countries." The publication of any evaluations may contribute to this political discussion.
64) The UK government provides a set of instruments for government departments and other interested 
target groups (publicly available). The guidance includes a "regulatory impact assessment template for 
government polices", a detailed guide and an "impact assessment calculator", which can all be downloaded 
on the government’s homepage and individually edited, see 
Regulatory impact assessments: Guidance for Government Departments, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/impact-assessments-guidance-for-government-departments 
(last visited on Sept. 12, 2016). Making RAI, its design and implementation transparent.
65) See ARAMIS Information System, https://www.aramis.admin.ch/?Sprache=en-US; see also 
Database for External Studies (including Evaluations), 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/studies.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
66) See Prognos, supra note 44, pp. 32-34. 
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light of a possible fear of negative public reactions. This problem can be properly 
addressed by a culture of openness and dialogue, and indeed, in Switzerland there 
is little reluctance to publish the results of an evaluation.
8. Alternatives, namely Public Consultations 
Evaluations are an important tool for better regulation. Still, one should not 
assume that they can cure all possible deficits. The legislator may for example ignore 
the results and, as stated, it is not practically feasible to evaluate every legal provision 
both ex ante and ex post. For this reason, one should also consider alternatives to 
evaluation and reflect on how to integrate evaluations into existing instruments and 
processes assuring legislative quality.
These questions are relevant to Switzerland. Evaluations do not have the same 
tradition as public consultations.67) In a nutshell, public consultations are conducted 
for every new or amended provision of federal or cantonal law. Public consultation 
commonly takes place before a draft law is subjected to the Parliament for 
deliberation and approval.68)
As a form of participation of stakeholders in the legislative process, consultations 
serve other goals than those of evaluations. Typically, consultations will inform the 
government on political feasibility and on practical questions such as implementatio
n.69) The feedback from stakeholders may be biased and does not satisfy any 
67) See Art. 147 BV; see Bundesgesetz über das Vernehmlassungsverfahren [Vernehmlassungsgesetz VlG] 
[Federal Act on the Consultation Procedure] Mar. 18, 2005, SR 172.061, Art. 2 et seq. (Switz.), "the 
consultation procedure has the aim of allowing the cantons, political parties and interested groups 
to participate in the shaping of opinion and the decision-making process of the Confederation" (Art. 
2 para. 1 VlG).
68) See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], OECD Reviews of Regulatory 
Reform, Regulatory Reform in Switzerland, Government Capacity to Assure High Quality Regulation, pp. 25-29 
(2006).
69) See Felix Uhlmann & Christoph Konrath, Chapter 5: Participation, in Legislation and Legisprudence in 
Europe, a Comprehensive Guide for Scholars and Practitioners (Ulrich Karpen & Helen Xanthaki eds., 
forthcoming 2017), pp. 78 et seq., stating that public consultation is not a "public opinion poll" but 
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methodological standards as evaluations do.70) Nonetheless, the insights from a 
consultation may concur with the results of an evaluation.71) This is especially true 
if one turns to the feasibility and the costs of implementation. It is well-known that 
stakeholders may point out practical problems that the legislator was unaware of.72)
Evaluations should be planned in respect to public consultation and vice versa. 
There is no general rule how to coordinate these two mechanisms. It may well be 
that the feedback from public consultation implies an in-depth evaluation of a 
specific question. It may also be sensible to include the evaluation in the 
documentation for public consultation as this has been pointed out before. Finally, 
it may also be necessary to run evaluations and consultations in parallel in order 
to save time in the process. 
indicates political alliances and adversaries with regard to a specific piece of legislation. Finally, public 
consultation takes place at an early stage of the legislative process and indicates potlical feasibility 
and implementation issues at a time when adjustments can still be discussed. Thus, these results may 
prevent legislation from being useless and therefore "stillborn". See also Naundorf & Radaelli supra note 
14, pp. 22-23, argue that consultation is "a fundamental component of regulatory evaluation and 
participatory governance and should be considered an ongoing instrument of quality management".
70) See Uhlmann & Konrath, supra note 69, pp. 80, 82, who take into account that participants of public 
consultations have individual interests and may be biased in that respect. Therefore, their imput may 
not represent civil society. Results of public consultation are rather a "crafting tool for legislation” 
and a very useful information pool than a source of absolute “legislative truth”. 
71) See extensively Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Background 
Document on Public Consultation, pp. 1 et seq. https://www.oecd.org/mena/governance/36785341.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
72) See Art. 2 para. 2 VlG, the purpose of the consultation procedure is "to provide information on material 
accuracy, feasibility of implementation and public acceptance of a federal project".
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9. Conclusion
In sum, evaluations are an important tool to safeguard legislative quality. Still, 
it is important to use this tool proportionally the more is not always the better. 
One should consider both ax ante- and ex post-evaluations, and one should also 
consider alternatives to evaluation. The state body conducting evaluations should 
have sufficient expertise and independence.
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Abstract
Many countries assess the effects of legislation by way of evaluation or regulatory 
impact assessment (RIA). The following article will discuss the functions of these 
methods and refer to the competent bodies’ responsibility for legislative evaluation 
from a Swiss legal perspective. It will be argued that a mechanical or 
"one-size-fits-all" approach does not best serve the goals behind these practices but 
that a tailored and proportional application is warranted. Hence, it will also 
tentatively outline best practices for evaluation.
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